MCP Server Manifest & Tool Security Linter API
Audit MCP server manifests for hidden tool poisoning, shell risks, and excessive permissions.
Issue and verify tamper-evident HMAC-signed receipts for autonomous AI agent actions. Issue and verify HMAC-SHA256 signed, hash-chained receipts for autonomous AI agent tool calls, approvals, and state mutations.
Additional endpoints in this module: POST /v1/agent-action-receipts/verify
{
"ok": true,
"data": {
"receipt_token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkFBUiIsImtpZCI6InYxIn0.eyJ2ZXIiOjEsImp0aSI6ImFhcl82N2M0NjE5ZjdhZjlmN2MxM2Y1ZjgyYmYiLCJpYXQiOjE3OTQ2Nzc5NzcsImV4cCI6bnVsbCwiYWdlbnRfaWQiOiJiaWxsaW5nLWFnZW50LXByb2QiLCJzZXNzaW9uX2lkIjpudWxsLCJ0b29sX25hbWUiOiJzdHJpcGVfcmVmdW5kIiwicG9saWN5X2RlY2lzaW9uIjoiYWxsb3ciLCJpbnB1dF9zaGEyNTYiOiI3NDIzNGU5OGFmZTc0OThmYjVkYWYxZjM2YWMyZDc4YWNjMzM5NDY0Zjk1MDcwM2I4YzAxOTg5MmY5ODJiOTBiIiwib3V0cHV0X3NoYTI1NiI6bnVsbCwicHJldl9oYXNoIjoiZ2VuZXNpcyJ9.aiCMzxg2SK0naMc5COCKuP4Bm711mF1JOU9ufhPqGBA",
"receipt_hash": "34cfe90866cdbe3baff3334bfb3843856f46799ae6bbb19d91c9490ee4b197dc",
"kid": "v1",
"issued_at": "2026-11-14T17:39:37.000Z",
"expires_at": null,
"payload": {
"ver": 1,
"jti": "aar_67c4619f7af9f7c13f5f82bf",
"iat": 1794677977,
"exp": null,
"agent_id": "billing-agent-prod",
"session_id": null,
"tool_name": "stripe_refund",
"policy_decision": "allow",
"input_sha256": "74234e98afe7498fb5daf1f36ac2d78acc339464f950703b8c019892f982b90b",
"output_sha256": null,
"prev_hash": "genesis"
}
},
"meta": {
"request_id": "req_aar_01",
"ms": 1
}
}
curl -X POST "https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/agent-action-receipts/issue" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TINPLATE_KEY" \
-d '{"agent_id":"billing-agent-prod","tool_name":"stripe_refund","action_input":{"charge_id":"ch_9921","amount_cents":4500},"secret":"hmac-signing-secret-at-least-16-chars"}'import { TinplateClient } from "@tinplate/sdk";
const tinplate = new TinplateClient({
apiKey: process.env.TINPLATE_API_KEY!,
});
const { data, meta } = await tinplate.call("/v1/agent-action-receipts/issue", {
"agent_id": "billing-agent-prod",
"tool_name": "stripe_refund",
"action_input": {
"charge_id": "ch_9921",
"amount_cents": 4500
},
"secret": "hmac-signing-secret-at-least-16-chars"
});
console.log(`[${meta.ms} ms]`, data);import requests
response = requests.post(
"https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/agent-action-receipts/issue",
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TINPLATE_KEY",
},
json={
"agent_id": "billing-agent-prod",
"tool_name": "stripe_refund",
"action_input": {
"charge_id": "ch_9921",
"amount_cents": 4500
},
"secret": "hmac-signing-secret-at-least-16-chars"
}
)
print(response.json())const response = await fetch("https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/agent-action-receipts/issue", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TINPLATE_KEY",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"agent_id": "billing-agent-prod",
"tool_name": "stripe_refund",
"action_input": {
"charge_id": "ch_9921",
"amount_cents": 4500
},
"secret": "hmac-signing-secret-at-least-16-chars"
}),
});
const result = await response.json();
console.log(result);{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "tinplate_agent_action_receipts",
"arguments": {
"agent_id": "billing-agent-prod",
"tool_name": "stripe_refund",
"action_input": {
"charge_id": "ch_9921",
"amount_cents": 4500
},
"secret": "hmac-signing-secret-at-least-16-chars"
}
}
}POST /v1/agent-action-receipts/issue)| Parameter | Type & Constraints | Description |
|---|---|---|
agent_id required |
stringminLen: 1, maxLen: 128 |
Field 'agent_id' |
session_id optional |
stringminLen: 1, maxLen: 128 |
Field 'session_id' |
tool_name required |
stringminLen: 1, maxLen: 128 |
Field 'tool_name' |
action_input optional |
any | null |
Field 'action_input' |
action_output optional |
any | null |
Field 'action_output' |
policy_decision optional |
"allow" | "repaired" | "escalated" | "blocked"default: "allow" |
Field 'policy_decision' |
prev_receipt_hash optional |
stringmaxLen: 128, default: "genesis" |
Field 'prev_receipt_hash' |
secret optional |
stringminLen: 16, maxLen: 512 |
HMAC signing secret (min 16 chars; or omit from body and pass via X-Tinplate-Signing-Secret header, or provide private_jwk). |
private_jwk optional |
object |
Optional Ed25519 (OKP) or P-256 (EC) private JWK for asymmetric EdDSA/ES256 receipt signing instead of HMAC-SHA256. |
kid optional |
stringminLen: 1, maxLen: 64 |
Field 'kid' |
ttl_seconds optional |
integermin: 60, max: 315360000 |
Field 'ttl_seconds' |
issued_at_epoch optional |
integer |
Field 'issued_at_epoch' |
data Object Fields (200 OK)| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
receipt_token |
string |
Field 'receipt_token' |
receipt_hash |
string |
Field 'receipt_hash' |
kid |
string |
Field 'kid' |
issued_at |
string |
Field 'issued_at' |
expires_at |
string | null |
Field 'expires_at' |
payload |
object |
Field 'payload' |
Release: v1.0.39 ·
Verified: 16 November 2026 ·
Portfolio Median: 0.318 ms in-Worker V8 compute (add 15–65 ms HTTPS RTT) ·
See Full Portfolio Benchmarks →
Direct Polar All-Access Keys unlock all 42 APIs (49 endpoints), /v1/pipeline, and /mcp on api.tinplate.dev:
Pro ($29/mo · 120 req/min · 100k/mo · 128 KB) or Team ($79/mo · 300 req/min · 500k/mo · 256 KB).
| Plan | Monthly Price | Included Requests | Rate Limit | Max Payload | Best For |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BASIC | $0.00 / mo | 500 / month | 10 req / min | 64 KB | Evaluation & CI smoke tests |
| PRO | $9.99 / mo | 15,000 / month | 60 req / min | 128 KB | Solo devs & production apps |
| ULTRA | $29.99 / mo | 100,000 / month | 300 req / min | 256 KB | Growing SaaS & multi-agent pipelines |
| MEGA | $79.99 / mo | 500,000 / month | 1,000 req / min | 256 KB | High-volume enterprise workloads |
Pass the previous receipt's receipt_hash as previous_receipt_hash when issuing the next receipt to create an immutable chain.
No. You store the compact signed receipt token in your own database or logs and verify it anytime via /v1/agent-action-receipts/verify.
Yes, signature comparison uses constant-time comparison.
Signing secrets and action payloads exist only in V8 isolate memory during the WebCrypto HMAC operation.
Worker Zero-Logging Guarantee: Cloudflare Workers Observability and invocation logging are disabled (observability.enabled = false, head_sampling_rate = 0, invocation_logs = false). Requests via RapidAPI or Zyla traverse marketplace proxies; use a Direct Bearer Key for zero-intermediary routing.
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