Log Redact & Secret Scanner API
Detect and mask leaked API keys, JWTs, and private keys in logs, diffs, and prompts.
Audit JWT tokens and JWK sets against RFC 8725 for alg:none, weak secrets, and leaked keys. Stateless JWT, JWS, and JWK security linter that audits tokens and JWKS against RFC 8725 & RFC 7518: detects alg:none, jku/kid injection, weak HMAC secrets, and leaked private keys.
{
"ok": true,
"data": {
"verdict": "fail",
"security_score": 10,
"grade": "F",
"decoded_header": {
"alg": "HS256",
"typ": "JWT"
},
"decoded_payload": {
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "John Doe",
"iat": 1516239022
},
"signature_present": true,
"signature_verified": true,
"weak_secret_cracked": "your-256-bit-secret",
"token_status": "missing_exp",
"findings": [
{
"category": "weak_hmac_secret",
"severity": "critical",
"rfc_reference": "RFC 8725 §3.5",
"description": "JWT is signed with a well-known weak secret ('your-256-bit-secret') and can be forged offline",
"remediation": "Immediately rotate the HMAC signing key to at least 256 bits of CSPRNG entropy."
},
{
"category": "claim_lifetime_hygiene",
"severity": "high",
"rfc_reference": "RFC 8725 §3.8",
"description": "JWT payload omits the 'exp' (Expiration Time) claim, creating a non-expiring bearer token",
"remediation": "Always include an 'exp' claim and enforce short access-token TTLs."
},
{
"category": "claim_lifetime_hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"rfc_reference": "RFC 8725 §3.8–3.9",
"description": "JWT omits standard scoping claims (iss, aud), weakening cross-service confused-deputy defenses",
"remediation": "Include and validate 'iss' (issuer), 'aud' (audience), and 'sub' (subject) on every token."
}
]
},
"meta": {
"request_id": "req_jwt_01",
"ms": 2
}
}
curl -X POST "https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/jwt-jwk-inspector" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TINPLATE_KEY" \
-d '{"token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"}'import { TinplateClient } from "@tinplate/sdk";
const tinplate = new TinplateClient({
apiKey: process.env.TINPLATE_API_KEY!,
});
const { data, meta } = await tinplate.call("/v1/jwt-jwk-inspector", {
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
});
console.log(`[${meta.ms} ms]`, data);import requests
response = requests.post(
"https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/jwt-jwk-inspector",
headers={
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TINPLATE_KEY",
},
json={
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
}
)
print(response.json())const response = await fetch("https://api.tinplate.dev/v1/jwt-jwk-inspector", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Authorization": "Bearer YOUR_TINPLATE_KEY",
},
body: JSON.stringify({
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
}),
});
const result = await response.json();
console.log(result);{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"id": 1,
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "tinplate_jwt_jwk_inspector",
"arguments": {
"token": "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMeJf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c"
}
}
}POST /v1/jwt-jwk-inspector)| Parameter | Type & Constraints | Description |
|---|---|---|
token optional |
stringmaxLen: 65536 |
Compact JWS / JWT string (header.payload.signature) to decode, verify, and audit against RFC 8725. |
hmac_secret optional |
stringmaxLen: 4096 |
Optional HMAC secret to verify HS256/HS384/HS512 signatures and check RFC 7518 key entropy requirements. |
jwk optional |
object |
Optional JWK or JWKS ({ keys: [...] }) object to audit for leaked private key parameters (d, p, q, k) and key strength. |
reference_time_unix optional |
integermin: 0 |
Optional Unix epoch timestamp (seconds) for deterministic exp/nbf/iat validation. |
max_ttl_seconds optional |
integermin: 0, default: 86400 |
Maximum recommended token lifetime (exp - iat) in seconds before flagging long-lived access tokens. |
data Object Fields (200 OK)| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
verdict |
"pass" | "warn" | "fail" |
Field 'verdict' |
security_score |
integer |
Field 'security_score' |
grade |
"A" | "B" | "C" | "D" | "F" |
Field 'grade' |
decoded_header |
object | null |
Field 'decoded_header' |
decoded_payload |
object | null |
Field 'decoded_payload' |
signature_present |
boolean |
Field 'signature_present' |
signature_verified |
boolean | null |
Field 'signature_verified' |
weak_secret_cracked |
string | null |
Field 'weak_secret_cracked' |
token_status |
"valid_window" | "expired" | "not_yet_valid" | "missing_exp" | "not_provided" |
Field 'token_status' |
findings |
object[] |
Field 'findings' |
Release: v1.0.39 ·
Verified: 16 November 2026 ·
Portfolio Median: 0.318 ms in-Worker V8 compute (add 15–65 ms HTTPS RTT) ·
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Yes, for HS256/HS384/HS512 tokens it automatically tests the signature against common weak default secrets ('secret', 'your-256-bit-secret', 'password', 'jwt_secret', etc.).
Misconfigured auth servers occasionally serialize full keypairs into /.well-known/jwks.json. Passing your JWKS to POST /v1/jwt-jwk-inspector immediately flags any exposed private key parameters (d, p, q, k).
Never. Workers Observability and invocation logs are disabled, and all inspection happens in ephemeral isolate memory.
Tokens and JWK sets are inspected in memory and never logged or stored.
Worker Zero-Logging Guarantee: Cloudflare Workers Observability and invocation logging are disabled (observability.enabled = false, head_sampling_rate = 0, invocation_logs = false). Requests via RapidAPI or Zyla traverse marketplace proxies; use a Direct Bearer Key for zero-intermediary routing.
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